When analyzing crime, the foreign population typically shows higher rates than the native population. However, crime statistics change significantly when comparing groups of the same age and gender. A detailed data analysis conducted in a scientific study by the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M) demonstrates that the apparent crime gap between the foreign and native populations is primarily due to the fact that the immigrant profile tends to concentrate more young men—the demographic sector with the highest crime rates in any society.

The research, recently published in the Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (REIS), concludes that structural and socioeconomic factors explain the crime gap and endorses regularization policies as effective security tools. "This work provides empirical evidence in a recurring social debate and concludes that immigrant status, on its own, does not explain crime levels once demographic factors and the socioeconomic context are taken into account," states the study's author, Jesús Javier Sánchez Barricarte, Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at UC3M.

Spain has undergone a highly significant demographic transformation in recent decades, going from barely 2% of the foreign population at the end of the 20th century to nearly 14% in 2025. In parallel, the notion that immigration brings greater insecurity has spread. Given the scarcity of robust empirical studies in the country on this potential link, the researcher set out to verify what the figures actually show. To achieve this, he analyzed more than 5.5 million offenses with final convictions recorded between 2007 and 2023, based on adult conviction statistics from the National Statistics Institute (INE). "What I have verified is that there is a stark contrast between what is perceived and what the data indicates," the author points out.

The key impact of demographic structure

One of the study's most significant contributions highlights the need to standardize crime rates to make methodologically valid comparisons. This is because crime is a variable that depends heavily on age and sex (being higher among males and young people), and the immigrant population is, on average, younger and has a higher proportion of males than the Spanish population. "If we want to compare populations with different demographic structures, performing a standardization exercise is imperative," Sánchez Barricarte explains. When applying this criterion, the statistical reality changes completely: "When rates are standardized, the gap between Spaniards and foreigners is cut in half. In other words, a large part of the gap has nothing to do with being an immigrant, but rather with age and gender structure."

The study shows that the remaining difference after standardization is also not explained by immigrant status itself. When various socioeconomic factors are taken into account, findings indicate that a higher presence of immigrants in a province is not associated with higher crime rates. Instead, factors that do consistently carry weight include the level of urbanization and the average age of the population.

"Across all population groups, crime rates are higher in cities than in rural areas, and it turns out that a larger percentage of immigrants live in urban areas," the UC3M researcher underscores. Other factors, such as average income levels and access to basic services like housing, also condition the levels of certain crimes. When controlling for these factors, no association is found between the percentage of the foreign population and crime rates.

Heterogeneity of origin and statistical distortions

The analysis highlights significant heterogeneity in crime levels depending on nationality, which invalidates any generalization. There are groups well above the native average (those from the Balkans have a rate nine times as high as the Spanish rate, Algeria five times as high as the Spanish rate, or Ecuador three times as high as the Spanish rate), while others present rates even lower than the Spanish average, such as those from India, China, the Philippines, or Pakistan. "If being an immigrant were the problem, we would not see such a wide dispersion," the professor argues, concluding that what explains the differences is not national origin, but rather the social and economic conditions of each group.

The researcher insists that distinguishing between "foreigner" and "immigrant" is fundamental to avoid distorting the figures. Conviction statistics record nationality but do not specify whether the person is a resident of Spain. Consequently, convictions of foreign tourists or members of international organized crime networks who do not reside in the country artificially inflate the crime rates of resident immigrants, explaining the elevated indicators for citizens from the Balkans and Georgia. Conversely, there is a notable underreporting of certain crimes committed by the native population, such as so-called white-collar crimes (financial fraud, corruption, or tax evasion), which show a higher incidence among the native population compared to the immigrant population and also account for part of the gap.

Furthermore, the data directly contradicts the perception of public alarm linked to irregular immigration. The study finds that between 2017 and 2023, the proportion of the irregular foreign population in Spain grew by 345%, while the standardized crime rate for foreigners dropped by 2%. "If it were true that irregular status caused crime rates to spike, that relationship would have to appear in the data. And it does not," he asserts.

Despite the general debunking of the link, the researcher clarifies that the study does not ignore the existence of real challenges. Specifically, it has found real and concerning differences in areas such as femicides or sexual offenses, which are associated with certain values and attitudes toward women and sexual minorities in the countries of origin—issues that demand the development of targeted public policies.

Organized crime, terrorism, and irregular status

The study contextualizes complex phenomena such as organized crime and jihadist terrorism. Sánchez Barricarte maintains that international organized crime follows its own dynamics and operates independently of settled immigration, often being composed of individuals who do not even reside in Spain: "It would be truly naive to think that restricting immigration will put an end to international organized crime."

Regarding jihadist terrorism, he points out that: "It is, above all, a security issue, not an exclusively migratory one: more than half of those arrested on these grounds between 2004 and 2023 were born in Spain." Furthermore, the analysis confirmed significant heterogeneity in crime rates among foreigners holding nationalities from Muslim-majority countries (with high rates for Algeria and Morocco, and rates lower than the Spanish average for Mali and Pakistan), finding no evidence linking the Islamic faith to higher levels of crime.

The underlying message of this scientific work is that immigrant status, on its own, does not explain crime. What truly influences it are structural factors such as age and sex composition, poverty, social exclusion, rural or urban residence, and access to housing and employment. For this reason, the professor concludes that integration and regularization policies, far from being a threat, help reduce crime, as regularization improves the living conditions of immigrants without harming the employment or wages of the native population: "Access to the formal labor market not only increases their income, but also increases the opportunity cost of committing a crime, by jeopardizing their economic and social stability." Migratory regularization policies are thus framed as effective tools for improving security and social cohesion, in an academic call to replace prejudice with data.

Vídeo: https://youtu.be/zVSjIYsp0R0