A researcher investigates how economic elites responded to deterioration of democratic checks and balances in the Japanese legislature (1936–1942)
The prevailing international environment is marked by rising geopolitical tensions, necessitating an in-depth examination of its underlying mechanisms. In a recent research article, a researcher from Waseda University highlights that democracies can weaken through shifts in elite alliances triggered by international economic and geopolitical situations, especially emphasizing the crucial role of economic and political elites, such as business leaders and legislators.
In recent years, many observers have noted parallels between the current international environment and the 1930s, including rising geopolitical tensions, political polarization, trade conflicts, and regional wars. This raised a broader question: How do changes in the international environment reshape domestic political landscapes? From an academic perspective, much of the existing research on democratic backsliding focuses on voters or on political actors who mobilize and manipulate voters. While these perspectives are important, the incentives and behavior of economic and political elites are often examined less systematically. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how changes in the global economic and political environment influence the choices made by these actors.
Furthermore, economic sanctions and trade restrictions are frequently used as tools of international policy, yet relatively little is known about how such measures affect domestic political coalitions within the targeted or affected countries.
In a new study, Associate Professor Makoto Fukumoto from the Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Japan, aimed to provide a clearer understanding of how international economic pressure can reshape domestic political alignments by examining historical cases, specifically focusing on the Japanese legislature from 1936 to 1942.
This study examines how economic interests shaped the behavior of political elites in prewar Japan as military influence expanded. Focusing on legislators with ties to different industries, it analyzes key parliamentary moments when they either resisted or supported the military’s suppression of dissent. The study highlights two major economic shocks: U.S. sanctions (1940–41), which harmed export-dependent sectors, and the expansion of military procurement, which benefited firms supplying the armed forces. Using statistical analysis, it finds a clear contrast: legislators linked to sanction-hit industries became significantly more supportive of military-backed policies, while those connected to procurement sectors showed no similar shift and, in some cases, became more independent. These findings challenge the common view that economic beneficiaries of war are the strongest supporters of authoritarian rule, showing instead that economic vulnerability can drive elites to align with authoritarian power.These insightful findings were published online in the journal
American Political Science Review on March 2, 2026.
This research helps us better understand how democracies can weaken during periods of international tension and economic disruption. In particular, it highlights the role of economic and political elites, such as business leaders and legislators, in shaping whether democratic institutions remain resilient or gradually erode. Public debate often focuses on voters when discussing democratic backsliding. However, political transitions are also strongly influenced by the decisions made by elites who control economic resources, political organizations, and legislative institutions.
The study shows that when internationally connected economic sectors come under pressure—for example, through trade conflicts or sanctions—elites associated with those sectors may lose political influence. This can shift the balance of power toward actors who support more authoritarian policies. The findings therefore suggest that international economic measures, such as sanctions or trade restrictions, can have unintended domestic political consequences. Policies designed to pressure governments may also reshape internal political coalitions in ways that affect democratic institutions.
The present work has two major real-life applications. One important application concerns the use of economic sanctions and trade restrictions as tools of international policy. Governments frequently rely on sanctions to pressure other states, but the domestic political effects of these measures are often complex. The research suggests that sanctions and trade conflicts can unintentionally weaken internationally connected economic actors who might otherwise favor moderation and cooperation. This insight can help policymakers better anticipate how economic pressure may reshape political coalitions within targeted countries.
A second application relates to understanding elite behavior in authoritarian or hybrid political systems. Political outcomes in such systems often depend on how business leaders, legislators, and other influential actors respond to shifts in power. The study shows that when certain groups of elites become economically vulnerable, they may be more likely to accommodate authoritarian initiatives rather than resist them. This perspective can help analysts and policymakers better interpret political developments in countries where formal democratic institutions are under strain.
Overall, by examining historical evidence from the 1930s, the research offers insights that remain relevant today. It helps policymakers, analysts, and the public better understand how global economic tensions can influence domestic political stability and democratic governance, concludes the author.
For readers interested in the full set of figures, tables, and supplementary analyses, an earlier working paper version of this study is publicly available through the Waseda University Institute of Political Economy (WINPEC) Working Paper Series. While the final and authoritative version is published in the
American Political Science Review, the working paper provides more accessible access to supplementary materials.
The working paper can be accessed here:
https://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/2025/12/E2526.pdf
Reference
Author: Makoto Fukumoto
Title of original paper: The Cornered Mouse: Sanctioned Elites and Authoritarian Realignment in the Japanese Legislature, 1936–1942
Journal: American Political Science Review
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055426101440
Affiliations: Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University
About Waseda University
Located in the heart of Tokyo, Waseda University is a leading private research university that has long been dedicated to academic excellence, innovative research, and civic engagement at both the local and global levels since 1882. The University has produced many changemakers in its history, including eight prime ministers and many leaders in business, science and technology, literature, sports, and film. Waseda has strong collaborations with overseas research institutions and is committed to advancing cutting-edge research and developing leaders who can contribute to the resolution of complex, global social issues. The University has set a target of achieving a zero-carbon campus by 2032, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations in 2015.
To learn more about Waseda University, visit
https://www.waseda.jp/top/en
About Associate Professor Makoto Fukumoto from Waseda University, Japan
Makoto Fukumoto is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Japan. He received an MSc in International Political Economy from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2015, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 2021. His research interests include political economy, political behavior, public policy, political geography, interest groups, pork-barrel politics, comparative political economy, urban politics, and public economics. He is a member of the Urban Economics Association, the American Political Science Association, and the Midwest Political Science Association.