In the wake of the tragic events of October 7, 2023—when Hamas launched a deadly and unprecedented assault on southern Israel—scrutiny has intensified over the historical roots of Gaza’s political trajectory. Against this backdrop, a compelling new study by Professor Elie Podeh of the Hebrew University revisits Israel’s 2005 Gaza Disengagement Plan, challenging the widespread perception that the move was a strictly unilateral one.

In his article, titled “Israel’s 2005 Disengagement from Gaza: A Multilateral Move Under Unilateral Façade,” published in Middle Eastern Studies, Prof. Podeh reveals that the withdrawal—was the product of coordination between Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the United States, Egypt, Jordan, and the international Quartet.

Based on extensive archival research, including leaked diplomatic correspondence and firsthand interviews with Israeli and U.S. policymakers, the article demonstrates how key aspects of the disengagement were jointly developed. For instance, arrangements for border control, economic transition, and security cooperation were all negotiated behind the scenes, especially under the guidance of American envoys and Egyptian mediators. The involvement of James Wolfensohn, then special envoy of the Quartet, and the appointment of U.S. General William Ward to oversee security coordination, underscore the international stakes of the plan.

“The disengagement was presented as unilateral to serve Israeli domestic political aims and to minimize negotiations with a fragmented Palestinian leadership,” said Prof. Podeh. “Yet in reality, the move was a multilateral enterprise, shaped by regional and global stakeholders.”

The article also critiques the aftermath of the disengagement. Podeh attributes its failure to two parallel weaknesses: Israel’s decision not to use the withdrawal as a springboard for renewed peace negotiations, and the Palestinian Authority’s inability to assert effective control over Gaza, allowing Hamas and Islamic Jihad to fill the vacuum.

This dual failure, he argues, not only undermined the short-term viability of the disengagement but also planted the seeds of Gaza’s ongoing isolation and radicalization. Nearly two decades later, the implications of that strategy remain painfully relevant. The October 7 attacks shocked the region and underscored how the vacuum created by the disengagement has enabled Hamas’s dominance in Gaza—a dynamic that has endured, in part, due to the missteps of 2005.