Amid escalating tensions and evolving diplomatic overtures, the relationship between Israel and Syria has entered yet another complex phase. In wake of the fall of the Assad regime, tentative diplomatic signals come against a backdrop of intensifying military activity. In a sweeping historical study published in Israel Studies (Vol. 29, Issue 2), Professor Elie Podeh of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem offers an insightful look into over seven decades of clandestine and public efforts to achieve peace between Israel and Syria.
“Surprisingly, the coming to power of a new Islamic regime rekindled the possibility of renewed Israeli-Syrian encounters,” observes Prof. Podeh, challenging conventional assumptions about the region’s diplomatic fault lines.
Titled “Talking to the Enemy: Clandestine and Public Encounters for Peace between Israel and Syria (1948–2023),” the article exposes the intricate and often overlooked diplomacy that has taken place behind the scenes—despite the enduring perception of Israel and Syria as bitter enemies.
Key Revelations and Historical Highlights
• Early Overtures: Long before Israel's establishment, Zionist leaders held dialogues with Syrian nationalists. The Faisal-Weizmann Agreement (1919) and other pre-1948 contacts reveal an early willingness for cooperation that was later drowned out by rising regional tensions.
• Post-1948 Clandestine Initiatives: Two Syrian military leaders, Husni Za‘im and Adib al-Shishakli, initiated peace feelers shortly after the 1948 war, offering refugee resettlement and non-belligerency in exchange for territorial adjustments. Both regimes were short-lived, and the efforts collapsed following their ousters.
• Assad Era Negotiations (1970–2000): Hafez al-Assad’s leadership brought the most sustained, albeit indirect, attempts at formal peace. Talks following the 1991 Madrid Conference culminated in U.S.-mediated negotiations throughout the 1990s, including the notable but ultimately unsuccessful Shepherdstown summit with PM Ehud Barak.
• Backchannels under Bashar al-Assad (2000–2011): Bashar continued engaging in covert diplomacy. Notable were two rounds of unofficial negotiations mediated first by Turkey and later by Switzerland, resulting in a “non-paper” proposing Israeli withdrawal from the Golan in exchange for normalization and Syrian disengagement from Iran and Hezbollah.
• 2011 Peace Proposal Collapse: In early 2011, secret U.S.-brokered negotiations nearly produced a breakthrough peace treaty. Assad agreed to full demilitarization, recognition of Israel, and strategic realignment—only to see the process derailed by the outbreak of the Syrian civil war.
Analytical Insights
Prof. Podeh attributes the repeated failures not merely to external politics but to recurring structural barriers:
• Deep Mutual Distrust and the process of “enmification”—the entrenched psychological and social perception of the other as a permanent enemy.
• Leadership Legitimacy Gaps, often preventing bold or risky moves.
• Unbridgeable Territorial Disputes, especially over the undefined 1967 borders and access to the Sea of Galilee.
• Lack of Societal Support for peace on both sides.
Despite this, Podeh stresses that nearly every Israeli prime minister since Rabin has entertained a withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace—always secretly, and always short of full Syrian demands.